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Defendant stands upon the arguments as set forth in

his Brief,

Other issues addressed by plaintiff's Brief will

not be a subject of this Brief.

Defendant similarly stands

upon the arguments in his Brief as to those issues.
ARGUMENT
POINT I: THERE IS NO EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD TO
SUPPORT THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING OF THAT CONDUCT OF
DEFENDANT RESULTED IN THE FAILURE TO PROCURE A SALE OF
THE SUBJECT PROPERTY.
Plaintiff states in its Brief:
These endeavors to sell the subject property
failed for various reasons, some due to the
Trustee's action, Lincoln's demand that the rate
of interest be increased because of a provision
of their note and mortgage, Trustee's demand to
make a profit on the transaction and Trustee's
failure to communicate offers to Four Seasons.
[Respondent's Brief at 4 ] . Plaintiff thus indicates that
potential sales of the property failed because of defendant's
actions.

This statement presumably is based upon the Findings

of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered by the trial court.
There is, however, no evidence in the record to support such a
finding, and, as such, it should be overturned by this Court.
Sharpe v. American Medical Systems, Inc., 671 P.2d 185 (Utah
1983) (judgment will be affirmed where findings of fact are
substantiated by the evidence).
There is no evidence in the record that defendant's
initial desire to dispose of the property at a slight profit to
the bankruptcy estate resulted in the failure to sell the
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subject property.

[Tr. at 38-40, 42.]

Instead, the

overwhelming evidence is that the sole factor resulting in the
failure to sell the property was the insistence by the first
mortagagee (Lincoln Savings) that its due on sale clause be
enforced and its interest rate be increased to the market
rate.

[Tr. at 34, 39, 41, 42, 45, 46, 158.]
Additionally, there is absolutely no evidence in the

record to support a finding that the defendant failed to
communicate offers for purchase to plaintiff.

The testimony of

J.F. Cannon, general partner of plaintiff is contrary to such
an assertion:
Q. (By Mr. Duffin) During that period of time
that the trustee—the trustee was in possession
from January 22, 1982 until the stay was lifted
in July of 1982. He sent you these two offers.
Do you know whether he was soliciting other
offers, or are there other offers that you do not
have here?
A.(By Mr. Cannon)
offers.

I don't know of any other

Q.

Those two were sent by you?

A.

Those two were sent to me from the trustee.

[Tr. at 36.]

The testimony of defendant Thomas D. Elliott

concurs with that given by Mr. Cannon:
Q. (By Mr. Duffin) Would it be safe in saying
that from your position as the trustee of
bankruptcy in this case, that the problem of the
sale was tied in to getting the underlying
financing people to agree with the terms of the
sale?
A.

(By Mr. Elliott)

Yes, in most cases.
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Q. How many sales did you originate in the six
months that you had the property?
A.

I don't recall.

Q. We know at least two, were there more you
didn't sent [sic] to us?
A, I think every one that was reduced to writing
we either discussed with Jess or we sent him a
copy of it.
Thus, the unrebutted evidence was that the failure to sell the
subject property was related to the terms and conditions
imposed by the underlying lien holders, not the conduct of
defendant.

The trial court's finding to the contrary should be

overturned, and to the extent the judgment entered by the trial
court in favor of plaintiff relied upon that finding, it, too,
should be overturned.

Sine v. Salt Lake Transportation Co.,

106 Utah 289, 147 P.2d 875 (1944).
POINT II: CONTRARY TO THE ASSERTIONS OF PLAINTIFF,
THE FACTS SHOW THAT HEALY WAS THE IMPLIED AGENT OF
PLAINTIFF.
Plaintiff correctly acknowledges that an agency may be
created by implication, estoppel, necessity or operation of
law.

Plaintiff also correctly reports the statements of law

contained in Forsevth v. Pendelton. 617 P.2d 358 (Utah 1980)
and True v. Hi-Plains Elevator Machinery, Inc., 577 P.2d 991
(Wyo. 1978).

Of course, the law recited in the aforementioned

cases is limited to the facts and circumstances of those
cases.

It is widely held that whether an implied agency exists

is dependent upon the particular facts and circumstances of a
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given case.

Durham v. Warnberg, 62 Or. App. 378, 660 P.2d 208

(1983); Curtis v. CIA Machinery, Inc., 571 P.2d 862 (Okla. App.
1977); Matsumara v. Eilert, 74 Wash. 2d 362, 444 P.2d 806
(1968).
Plaintiff argues in its Brief that the facts of the
present case do not create an implied agency because there is
no evidence that plaintiff as principal controlled the actions
of Healy as agent.

[Respondent's Brief at 13.]

Plaintiff also

argues that implied agency cannot exist in the present case
because both plaintiff's general partner, J.F. Cannon, and
Healy denied the existence of an agency relationship.

rid.1

Assuming arguendo, that, as plaintiff contends, no
evidence of control exists in the record, control of the agent
is only one factor considered in determining the existence of
an implied agency; it is not necessarily the determinative
factor.

The court in Abel v. Firs Bible and Missionary

Conference, 57 Wash. 2d 853, 360 P.2d 356 (1961), ruled that
[W]hile agency can be inferred from the right of
control, it is still only evidence of an agency.
Here there is no dispute that the act in question
was performed in fulfillment of the Fir's
contract. When the maxim qui facit per alium
facit per se is clearly applicable, an agency is
established without reference to the right of
control.
Id. at 358.

The Abel ruling was issued in the context of a

negligence action arising out of an automobile accident;
nevertheless, the principle articulated in Abel that clearly
established control is not necessary to a finding of implied
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agency when other facts so suggest an agency relationship is
applicable to the present case.

Accordingly, the sum total of

facts and circumstances in the present case as set forth in the
defendant's Brief and as further set forth below compel the
conclusion that Healy was the implied agent of plaintiff.
An implied agency may be based upon the past dealings
and prior habits established between the parties.

True v.

Hi-Plains Elevator Machinery, Inc., 577 P.2d 991 (Wyo. 1978).
The evidence in the present case reveals a course of past and
present real estate transactions and partnerships involving
plaintiff's general partners and Healy.

[Tr. at 60, 75, 118.]

Furthermore, it is not necessary that the alleged principal and
agent understand their relationship to be one of principal and
agent if by their actions such relationship exists in fact, and
it matters not that the parties do not call themselves agent
and principal.

Curtis v. CIA Machinery, Inc., 571 P.2d 862

(Okla. App. 1977); Petersen v. Turnbull, 68 Wash. 2d 231, 412
P.2d 349 (1966).

That concept was clearly stated by the court

in Canyon State Canners v. Hooks, 74 Ariz. 70, 243 P.2d 1023
(1952):
The relation of agency need not depend upon
express appointment and acceptance thereof, but
may be, and frequently is, implied from the words
and conduct of the parties and the circumstances
of the particular case. If, from the facts and
circumstances of the particular case, it appears
that there was at least an implied intention to
create it, the relation may be held to exist
notwithstanding a denial by the alleged
principal, and whether or not the parties
understood it to be an agency. . . .
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Id. at 1024 (quoting 2 C.J.S., Agency §23 at 1045-46).

Thus,

an implied agency may arise notwithstanding the denials of the
principal and agent and regardless of their intent to create an
agency.
Circumstantial evidence of an agency may suffice to
establish an implied agency notwithstanding the sworn denials
of the principal and agent that no agency relationship was
established.

Curtis v. CIA Machinery, Inc.. 571 P.2d 862

(Okla. App. 1977) (implied agency based on circumstantial
evidence although principal and agent had filed affidavits
denying any agency relationship).
In Butler v. Colorado International Pancakes, Inc.,
510 P.2d 443 (Colo. App. 1973), a case particularly instructive
for the present case, the court held that an implied agency
existed between a franchisor and a former franchisee in the
acquisition of a franchise from a sub-franchisee.

In so

ruling, the court concluded (1) that the franchisor had
requested the former franchisee to repurchase the franchise for
the franchisor's benefit, (2) that the former franchisor had
carried out that request, and (3) that, between the two, only
the franchisor was in a position to benefit from the
transaction.

The court reasoned that, notwithstanding the

parties protestations to the contrary, an agency may be created
by the conduct of the principal and agent. The law, the court
emphasized, "[W]ill look at the conduct and factual
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relationship rather than the intent or words of the
agreement."

Id. at 445.

Similarly, an implied agency should have been found by
the trial court based upon the circumstances and facts of the
present case.

Plaintiff's general partner requested that Healy

purchase the subject property for the benefit of plaintiff.
[Tr. at 7]. Plaintiffs general partner and Healy were in
continual contact concerning the property for a period of many
months following the filing of Frontier's bankruptcy petition.
[Tr. 87-91].

Pursuant to plaintiff's request, Healy purchased

an interest in the property.

Healy, a sophisticated

businessman, acquired the property knowing full well that all
attempts to sell the property in the past year had failed and
with full knowledge that the first mortgagee insisted on
enforcing its due-on-sale clause.

[Tr. at 116-118.]

It could

be concluded that only plaintiff was in a position to benefit
from Healy's acquisition of the property.
Other circumstantial evidence of a principal-agent
relationship includes:
(1) Healy and plaintiff's general partners had been
for several years, and still were at the time of
Healy's acquisition of the subject property,
partners in various real estate endeavors.
at 75-76].
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[Tr.

(2) Plaintiff's general partner discussed with Healy,
prior to Healy's acquisition of the subject
property, subordinating his position to that of
Lockhart Company and Zions Bank.

[Tr. at 91].

(3) During the period of Healy's ownership of the
property, plaintiff continued to make payments on
underlying obligations secured by the subject
property.

[Tr. at 100, 101].

(4) Healy conveyed the property to plaintiff's
general partners and their wives —

just two

short months after his acquisition of the
property —

purportedly in exchange for the

forgiveness of an undefined past indebtedness.
The entire transaction was evidenced by only a
Warranty Deed.

[Tr. at 107].

Based upon the foregoing unrebutted evidence, defendant submits
that Healy was plaintiff's implied agent despite the denials by
plaintiff and Healy that an agency relationship existed.
POINT III: ALTHOUGH BENEFIT OF BARGAIN DAMAGES ARE
GENERALLY APPLICABLE TO THE BREACH OF A REAL ESTATE
CONTRACT, PLAINTIFF'S DAMAGES IN THE PRESENT CASE
AROSE FROM THE NOTE AND MORTGAGE, NOT THE CONTRACT.
Defendant does not dispute the argument set forth by
plaintiff in its Brief that benefit of the bargain damages
generally are properly awarded for a breach of a land sale
contract.

This argument, however, misconstrues defendant's

_9„
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contention . Defendant contends that any damages suffered byplaintiff in the present action arose under the note and
mortgage (by virtue of plaintiff's election to treat the
Uniform Real Estate Contract (MContractM) as a note and
mortgage), not under the Contract. While this distinction may
appear to be less significant for purposes of the present case,
it is crucial that damages be properly characterized for
purposes of payment of plaintiffs alleged claim from the
Frontier bankruptcy estate*
On August 6, 1983, plaintiff exercised its election
under paragraph 16(c) of the Contract to treat the Contract as
a note and mortgage.

[R. at 1930, Tr. at 36, Respondent's

Brief at 8]. Subsequently, plaintiff commenced its action to
foreclose its mortgage.

Prior to completion of that

foreclosure proceeding, however, plaintiff's mortgage was
M

sold-out" by the foreclosure of the senior Coleman trust

deed.

Thus plaintiff, as a junior interest holder, presumably

had lost its security.

The law is clear in this and other

jurisdictions that if a junior lienholder's security has been
lost or disposed of through the foreclosure of a senior
interest, a personal action may be brought on the note.
Lockhart Company v. Eguitable Realty, Inc., 657 P.2d 1333
(Utah

1983); Utah Mortgage and Loan Company v. Black, 618 P.2d

43 (Utah 1980); Cache Valley Banking Company v. Logan Lodge No.
1453, B.P.O.E., 88 Utah 577, 56 P.2d 1046 (1936); Gebrueder
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Heidemann, K.G. v. A.M.R. Corporation, 107 Idaho 275, 688 P.2d
1180 (1984); Keever v. Nicholas Beers Company, 96 Nev. 509, 611
P.2d 1079 (1980); McMillan v. United Mortgage Co., 84 Nev. 99,
437 P.2d 878 (1968).
Plaintiff, however, did not bring an action on the
note after its security was lost.

It amended its complaint to

assert an action under the Contract even though an action on
the note was still available.
M

In essence, plaintiff effected a

de-electionH, reverting to an action on the Contract after it

had already elected to treat the Contract as a note and
mortgage.

Defendant submits that such a de-election is

improper.

No basis in law can be found for allowing such an

action.

Rather, as stated above, all applicable authorities

would require that an action be brought on the note.
Accordingly, plaintiff improperly brought its action on the
Contract and the trial court's characterization of plaintiff's
damages as arising under the Contract was likewise improper.
CONCLUSION
Defendant seeks the reversal of the trial court's
judgment in favor of plaintiff based upon the arguments and law
set forth in defendant's Brief previously filed with this Court
and this Reply.

Specifically, defendant submits that no

evidence exists in the record to support the trial court's
findings that defendant's conduct resulted in the failure to
procure a sale of the subject property.
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Additionally,

defendant contends that under all the facts and circumstances
of the case and the relationship between Healy and plaintiffs
general partners, Healy was, at the very least, the implied
agent of plaintiff in acquiring the subject property.

Finally,

defendant submits that after plaintiff's election to treat the
Contract as a note and mortgage, and after the security for the
note was lost through the foreclosure of a senior trust deed,
plaintiff was left with an action on the note, not the
Contract.

Based on the foregoing and the Brief previously

filed by defendant, the judgment of the trial court should be
reversed.
DATED this 1st day of November, 1985.
LeBOEUF, LAMB, LEIBY & MacRAE
< r i\

-. M< /
By

' '" ' " '
Counsel for Defendant
1000 Kearns Building
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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